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The purpose of this paper is to examine the governmental and market 
mechanisms that are being developed in the world financial community as 
ways to complement and substitute for the gap created by IMF deficiencies. 
This review has two objectives in mind. The first amounts to a stock-taking: 
an assessment of what defenses, in addition to a weakened IMF, are in place 
to prevent and to deal with financial turbulence. The second objective is 
more pro-active; the discovery of non-IMF, alternative defenses against 
instability would provide a basis for measures and policies that could reduce 
the risk and costs of instability, independently of IMF reform. 
 
The paper reviews the core IMF functions - crisis resolution, exchange rate 
management, financial policy coordination and surveillance - and finds 
examples of non-IMF organizational arrangements in all cases. However, the 
paper focuses in particular on the insurance role of the Fund and argues that 
developing countries are developing alternative insurance mechanisms, from 
a higher level of reserves to regional co-insurance facilities to remittances as 
a counter-cyclical source of foreign exchange. The de facto exit of its 
clientele, driven by the combination of high political costs associated with 
Fund borrowing and growing availability of alternatives, now poses an 
unprecedented challenge for the Fund, in particular pressures on its income. 
Given the close link between exit and the Fund’s high borrowing costs, 
linked in turn to its high administrative expenses, the paper also examines 
the options available to the Fund if it is to reverse its loss of clientele. In 
particular, in addition to governance reform, the Fund’s future seems to 
require significant cuts in its administrative budget, using budget savings to 
lower borrower interest rates. We conclude with an assessment of the 
systemic implications – stability and possible deflationary bias – of a 
continuing non-reformed IMF accompanied by a continuing move towards 
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The IMF is rudderless and ineffective.1 It is suffering from an identity 
crisis2, waning influence3 and a reduced role. It is on the brink of 
irrelevance.4 As a result, the world economy, basically, isn’t managed at 
all.5 The IMF has long since lost its role as the world’s central banker,6 has 
lost sight of where it wants to go,7 and suffers from a mismatch between 
aspirations and authority and instruments. No single step will restore the 
Fund to its prior respected position.8 Each of the preceding statements was 
made publicly over the last two years by a respected international financial 
analyst. Each statement was followed by a call for IMF reform, in many 
cases, by specific proposals. For several years, the reform debate has 
concentrated the attention of senior international finance specialists. 
Meanwhile, however, markets and governments and civil associations have 
been developing alternative solutions to the various functional deficits that 
result from the lack of an effective IMF.  
 
In the late 1990s, the Fund appeared to be at the zenith of its influence. Its 
attempt in 1997 to change the Articles of Agreement to make capital account 
liberalization a formal goal, and its subsequent role in the financial crisis that 
began in Asia in 1997-98 and spread to Russia and Brazil in 1998-99 gave 
the Fund an unprecedented global role. New forays such as the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) drew the institution into core 
development issues hitherto the preserve of the multilateral development 
banks. But these initiatives did not reverse the underlying trend to 
irrelevance of the institution, while the PRGF may have turned out to be a 
Pyrrhic victory.  
 
Today, just a few years later, the Fund’s future appears much bleaker. Not 
only is demand for its resources at a historic low, but borrowers are rushing 
to prepay the institution. In 2003, Thailand finished paying off its 
obligations two years ahead of schedule while in 2004 Russia prepaid its 
$3.3 billion debt to the IMF. Then in December 2005 and January 2006, 
                                                 
1  
2 Ted Truman, interview in Finance and Development. October 31, 2005, p. 321. 
3 Ted Truman, op. cit., p. 321. 
4 Martin Wolf, Financial Times, February 22, 2006.  
5 John Williamson, “Reforms to the International Monetary System to prevent Unsustainable Global 
Imbalances,” in World Economic Forum, The International Monetary Fund in the 21st Century: Interim 
report of the International Monetary Convention Project, p.22.  
6 Rawi Abdelal, comment at IIE Conference on IMF Reform, September 23, 2005.  
7 Ted Truman, op. cit., p. 321. 
8 Ted Truman, Background paper prepared for the IIE Conference on IMF Reform, September 23, 2005, p. 
1.  
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Argentina and Brazil announced their decision to repay their entire debt to 
the Fund ($15.5 billion in the case of Brazil and $9.8 billion in the case of 
Argentina). Pakistan, which owes $1.5 billion and is currently the third-
largest debtor, has said that it  is seeking to cut its dependence on the Fund; 
Ukraine, the fourth largest debtor, has declined any further assistance; and 
Serbia has announced that it would not increase its borrowings. In fiscal year 
2005 just six countries had Stand-by Arrangements – the lowest number 
since 1975. The volume of lending rebounded in the current fiscal year, but 
almost entirely due to one country – a $10 billion loan package to Turkey). 
 
A charitable interpretation is that the current decline in the demand for Fund 
resources is part of cyclical process. The Fund, to quote Barry Eichengreen, 
is “a rudderless ship in a sea of liquidity.” If that were the case, the raison 
d'etre of the Fund would be justified. After all, the importance of insurance 
is not diminished if insurance agencies are called in only occasionally. 
However, it is worth contrasting the global payment systems in the aftermath 
of the oil price shocks of 1973-74 and 1979-80 with 2005-06.  In stark 
contrast to the earlier two shocks which created major global disequilibria 
and led many developing countries to avail of the Fund’s facilities, there is 
little demand this time around. To be sure, this reflects structural and 
epistemic changes in developing countries, in which the Fund played an 
important role. And greater liquidity in capital markets has given many 
middle-income developing countries alternatives, while low interest rates 
have made new financial emergencies less likely.  
 
But there is more to the story. The Fund no longer has the mystique and its 
imprimatur no longer carries the weight previously associated with the 
institution, despite the continuing appearance of an all-powerful and non-
accountable institution.  
 
For some time there has been a broad consensus on the need to reform the 
IMF. Ideas for  reform cover virtually every aspect of the Fund, from its 
surveillance role to its role in debt management and emergency lending, to 
the nature of its advice and the roles it needs to add or discard to its 
governance (for a recent elaboration see Akyüz (2005), Buira (2004), Woods 
(2005). However, there is little agreement when it comes to the details of the 
reforms. In the past quarter century, developing countries have been 
periodically afflicted by financial crisis. Each flurry of activity has resulted 
in an expansion in the scale and scope of Fund itself. Consequently the 
institution has been blasé with the reality that its principal shareholders will 
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ensure that the institution will “evolve through a series of ever more bland 
communiqués and meaningless statements.”9  
 
But today the Fund faces perhaps its gravest crisis, the result not of 
opprobrium but of irrelevance. The realization that if the Fund is not “kept 
up-to-date… [it] risk[s] suffering a lengthy senescence,”10 may well prompt 
real reforms. However, as this paper argues, while developing countries 
should continue to press for reforms, they should take heed of just how little 
past calls for reforms have advanced. Consequently, they must complement 
the focus on reform with exploring alternatives outside the IMF which hold 
the potential to not only give developing countries greater bargaining 
leverage with the Fund but also, by increasing competition, spur the 




C. ALTERNATIVES TO THE FUND 
 
Several factors have contributed to the development of alternative 
mechanisms to carry out particular IMF functions. Perhaps the most 
important has been the rapid growth of financial markets, and especially 
bond markets, which in turn has driven the expansion of institutions that 
monitor and carry out continuous market surveillance, notably rating 
agencies and other private and governmental institutions that track financial 
conditions. A second factor has been an equally impressive expansion in 
networking and local or regional cooperation and integration. Bryant [2004] 
has pointed to the “Multiplicity of institutional venues – consultative groups 
and international organizations – [that are] involved in surveillance of 
financial standards and prudential oversight. Similarly heterogeneous and 
complex institutions are involved in the nascent supranational surveillance 
of all other types of economic policies.” 11  Cerny [2002] makes a similar 
point, speaking of the “privatization of transnational regulation” through the 
expansion of “webs of governance,” of “epistemic communities,” and 
“multi-level governance” involving government and private sectors and civil 
associations. The third development, closely related to the above, has been 
modern communications technology which has brought about a 
                                                 
9 Mervyn King, Governor, Bank of England, quoted in Financial Times February 21, 2006. 
10 Martin Wolf, “The world needs a tough and independent monetary Fund,” Financial Times,  February 
22, 2006.   
11 Bryant, pp. 10-11.  
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multiplication in the volume, access and speed of information, enormously 
facilitating surveillance by non-official actors.  These contextual trends help 
to explain the specific mechanisms, discussed below, that are being used to 








Although the Fund has been a pivotal player in many debt and financial 
crises during the 1980s and the 1990s, it began to be seen by developing 
countries less as an impartial referee than as a debt collector for private 
creditors. In the late 1990s, the Fund proposed sovereign debt restructuring 
mechanisms (SDRM). Even if the Fund had been successful, the SDRM 
would have had limited utility since debt flows were becoming a much 
smaller part of total financial flows. In any event the SDRM did not go 
anywhere as the international community chose to pursue a more market-
driven approach through the use of collective active clauses (CAC) in bond 
contracts. Neither debtors nor creditors appear enthusiastic about the Fund’s 
role in restructuring under CACs. As the Argentinean and Russian defaults 
have shown, countries have realized that rather than perennial rounds of debt 
restructuring with the IMF playing a central role, countries may be better off 
simply ignoring the Fund. The results (at least till now) don’t seem to 
indicate that these countries are any worse off than if they had elected to use 
the offices of the IMF.   
 
Managing the International Monetary System  
 
The primary role of the Fund on exchange rate management had vanished 
with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Consequently, its original 
mandate notwithstanding, the Fund has been much more voluble on its 
member countries’ fiscal policies than their exchange rate policies. Although 
recent G-7 communiqués have emphasized the importance of flexibility in 
exchange rate systems, countries continue to peg their exchange rates and 
there is not much that the Fund has been able to do about it.   
Williamson (2005) has emphasized the need for the Fund to act as a referee 
on disputes over exchange rates and called for the institution to develop a 
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system of reference exchange rates to prevent unsustainable global 
imbalances. He argues that such a system would help secure global policy 
consistency. The main problem with these arguments is that the risks to 
global financial stability are from the systemically important countries and 
regions, such as global imbalances caused by the huge U.S. current account 
deficit, China’s managed currency system, or Europe’s rigid labor and 
product markets. But these are the very actors on whom the Fund has little 
influence and who are least likely to allow the Fund to constrain their 
autonomy. It is unclear why moving from the current ambiguous guidelines 
to more well-defined rules (through a system of reference exchange rates) 
would resolve the enforcement problem. That depends critically on the 
confidence of players in the institution itself, which in turn is singularly 
dependent on a perception of presumed neutrality and a referee role of the 
institution that few emerging markets are willing to accept given the current 
governance structure of the IMF. 
Indeed even the SDR as a notional unit of exchange now faces competition. 
In spring 2006, the ADB is planning to launch a notional unit of exchange, 
called the Asian Currency Unit (ACU), which would help track the relative 
values of Asian currencies. Modeled on the Ecu (the forerunner of the Euro), 
the ACU would be calculated using a basket of 13 regional currencies, 
weighted according to the size of each economy.  The ACU would allow 
monitoring of both the collective movement of Asian currencies against 
major external currencies, such as the US dollar and the Euro, as well as the 
individual movement of each Asian currency against the regional average. 
Small borrowers are also expected to issue bonds denominated in ACUs 




An important role of the Fund has been to function as “a trusted, 
independent and expert secretariat” for policy makers around the globe. A 
very evident sign of its failure (on perhaps all three attributes) has been the 
proliferation of alternatives. A variety of institutional mechanisms are 
setting, interpreting, diffusing and enforcing rules on affecting global 
financial stability, ranging from purely governmental to purely private, with 
complex public-private hybrids added in. Ad hoc non-treaty 
intergovernmental groupings like the G-7, G-10, and G-20 are agenda 
setting and rule ratification institutions. Intergovernmental organizations like 
the IMF, World Bank, IFC, and BIS make some rules, but more importantly, 
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serve as transmission and enforcement mechanisms for rules developed 
elsewhere. Increasingly the rules underpinning global financial governance 
are being set by private actors (IFAC, IASC) and groupings of national 
regulatory institutions (IOSCO, IAIS). Appendix I lays out the goals, 
representation, decision rules, and agenda setting capacity of the principal 
institutional underpinnings of global financial governance.    
 
Two features of this institutional mix are worth highlighting. One, there is 
considerable variation in forms of representation, goals, and authority. Two, 
there are overlapping jurisdictions in several areas, which is leading to the 
formation of “second generation” emanation institutions (the Joint Forum on 
Supervision of financial conglomerates run jointly with the Basle Committee 
on Banking Supervision, IOSCO and IASC, is an example). Developing 
countries should give greater emphasis to participating in these multiple 
fora, rather than wringing their hands about their marginalization in the 
Fund. 
 
Surveillance Function  
 
Besides its insurance function (emergency lending), surveillance has long 
been seen as the Fund’s other critical function. Compared to its early years, 
the very success of the Fund in ensuring greater transparency in countries’ 
macro accounts has meant that a variety of institutions (both private and 
public) play a role through their reports and analysis, which are similar to 
those of the Fund. Moreover, a key weakness of the Fund’s surveillance is 
that issues in Article IV consultations are negotiated ex ante with the 
systemically important countries, implying that the latter exercise agenda 
control. The coverage of private rating agencies has grown enormously, 
extending to both sovereign and private debt, to most middle income 
countries and even to many Sub-Saharan nations. In addition to wide 
coverage and freedom from the political inhibitions that limit the Fund, 
surveillance carried out by the private sector is a source of frequent and up-
to-date information, in contrast to the relative infrequency of Article IV 
consultations which occur only every 12-18 months and, in some cases, less 
frequently.  
 
Proposals to rescue Fund surveillance stress the need to separate its 
surveillance and lending functions so as to avoid any perception of conflict 
of interest. The separation would apparently enhance the independence and 
credibility of the Fund’s technical judgment. However, enhanced 
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surveillance of the global economy and a legal foundation for the 
international financial system require a tougher and more independent role 
for the Fund, a delegation of authority that is not likely to be accepted by the 
newly systemically important countries unless it is tied to a fairer quota 
allocation. 
 
Better surveillance could result if the Fund were reorganized to reflect the 
fact that much of what is called globalization is really regionalization. Trade 
and exchange rate policies are taking on an increasingly regional character, 
reflecting in part the fact that international trade has grown faster within 
regions than between regions. The Fund should adopt an organizational 
structure akin to that of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, with regional 
branches acting as the principal regional institutional mechanisms for 
coordination and surveillance, leaving a smaller central core to focus on 





For most developing countries, the Fund’s insurance role – short-term BOP 
support during times of crisis, when countries cannot avail of any other 
sources of external finance – has been its most important function. That is 
when the Fund has most power, and where controversy over its use has been 
most manifest. Thus, finding alternatives to the Fund’s monopoly in this area 
will do more to change the relationship between the IMF and developing 
countries than any other issue.  
 
Developing countries have several external financing options in the event of 
a balance of payments crisis. First, they could draw up credit lines on an 
ongoing basis to preempt crises of illiquidity. But the volume depends on 
internal economic fundamentals, confidence in international markets, and 
the predisposition of the G-7.12  
 
A second option would be to seek self-insurance. There are two main 
possibilities here. The most obvious is the buildup of reserves. Indeed the 
most significant sign of dissatisfaction with the Fund is the very conscious 
                                                 
12 In 1995, in the aftermath of Mexico’s crash Argentina faced a liquidity crisis and entered into US$6.7 
billion worth of “reverse repo” arrangements with 14 international banks that gave it access to liquidity in 
the event of a sudden large capital flight. The banks charged Argentina a fee together with Argentine bonds 
as collateral. 
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choice of developing countries to sharply increase their foreign exchange 
reserves in recent years (Table 1). What is driving this? The demand for 
reserves is usually modeled on the lines of a buffer stock model, whereby 
the macroeconomic adjustment costs without reserves are balanced with the 
cost of holding reserves. Another way of looking at a reserve buildup is 
analogous to the precautionary motive for savings traditionally put forward 
for explaining individual consumption (and savings) behavior (Aizenman 
and Lee Marion (2005)). Kapur and Patel (2003), extend this line of thinking 
by stressing two additional factors: strategic considerations arising from 
prevailing and likely geo-political realities, and the high prospective political 
price that the government of the day will have to pay if the country faces an 
external payments crisis (i.e. if the country runs out of foreign exchange 
reserves). 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
 
While in some cases (most notably in East Asia), countries have been 
building up their reserves to prevent appreciation of their currency, in the 
vast majority of cases the primary motive has been “self-insurance.” To 
guard themselves against external shocks, developing countries can either 
seek some sort of joint insurance or attempt to obtain self-insurance. The 
institutional mechanism for the former has been the IMF, and for the latter 
foreign exchange reserves. The trade off between the two has been between 
political and financial costs. While borrowing from the Fund has lower 
financial costs, the political costs have been high. As conditionalities 
mounted so did the political costs. In retrospect, the Asian financial crisis 
was the turning point. Policy makers are well aware of the humiliation 
heaped on East Asian economies in the course of their Fund programs 
during the East Asian crisis from 1997-99. Although the Fund has changed 
tack since then, its perceived lack of independence means that policy makers 
would be understandably risk-averse. Developing countries appear to be 
prepared to pay a high financial cost (estimated to be about one percent of 
GDP of developing countries taken as a whole) to preempt the prospect of a 
ruinous political cost (Rodrik, 2006).13  
                                                 
13 Generally these costs are calculated as the difference between short term borrowing abroad and yield of 
liquid foreign assets (e.g. US Treasuries) in which reserves are usually invested. One puzzle (highlighted 
by Rodrik) is why countries in their quest to insulate themselves from financial crises choose to increase 
their foreign reserves rather than reduce their short term liabilities. Rodrik notes that developing countries 
have resorted to the former but the optimal solution is in fact a combination of the two measures. This 
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Thus, the high costs of holding reserves notwithstanding, they are still a 
more attractive option relative to availing of any contingent credit line, 
either from markets or the IMF. For one, the very act of securing contingent 
credit facilities may trigger a downward spiral of confidence that a 
government would want to avoid in the first place. Moreover, once a crisis 
builds up it is exceedingly difficult to either predict or control its 
momentum. High levels of uncertainty enhance the case for the status quo 
option (i.e. hold high reserves and pay a financial premium). This is even 
more the case given current geopolitical realities where economic pressure, 
whether through international financial institutions or on trade policies or 
even something as seemingly mundane as travel advisories, means a high 
level of reserves is essential for a country to maintain policy autonomy. 
Large reserves also help to reassure foreign investors that the likelihood of 
default on foreign currency denominated liabilities is extremely small.  
 
Another source of self-insurance, especially for poorer developing countries 
whose exports are insufficient to build reserves, is from their citizens abroad. 
Remittances have emerged as an important (in some cases, critical) source of 
financial flows for many developing countries. These flows come without a 
plethora of conditionalities, are unrequited transfers (and therefore do not 
require repayment), and increase in times of shocks. They are allowing many 
developing countries to cover their trade deficits and therefore avoid the 
cycle of unsustainable external borrowings to cover high current account 
deficits, thereby necessitating an IMF program.  
 
But a country’s diaspora can be a source of self-insurance not just through 
accretion in the current account (in the form of remittances) but in the capital 
account as well. For instance in 1998, when India faced sanctions and global 
financial markets were in turmoil, the country raised US$4.2 billion through 
India Resurgent Bonds (IRBs) and again in 2000, apprehensive about its 
balance of payments prospects, India raised another US$5.5 billion through 
the India Millennium Deposit (IMD) scheme. While both issues (especially 
the latter) were expensive, they were much less costly than any other 
alternative. And the experience underscored a new possibility: a country 
with a large overseas diaspora could raise significant resources at relatively 
                                                                                                                                                 
would not only decrease this social cost of holding excess foreign reserves, but also increase liquidity to 
respond to external shocks. 
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short notice, without having to go to the Fund. Nonetheless there are clear 
limits as to the amount of money that can be raised through this route. 
 
Political motivations have also led to emergency financing between 
countries, as illustrated by Venezuela’s recent offer to Argentina to buy $3.4 
billion of Argentinean government bonds, of which $1.1 billion has been 
disbursed thus far. Similar financing has been a long established practice 
between oil rich and needy Muslim nations in the Middle East and Africa.  
 
Developed countries had already developed self- and joint-insurance 
systems. It was the establishment of the General Agreements to Borrow (the 
GAB) among the G-10 in 1964 that undermined the Fund's raison d'etre for 
the industrialized countries. Following the onset of the Asian crisis, the U.S. 
shot down the idea of an Asian Monetary Authority and severely criticized 
the Asian Development Bank when it attempted to adopt a position different 
from the prescriptions of the IMF. In the last few years Asian countries have 
renewed efforts at establishing swap facilities between the region’s central 
banks to pool resources against a speculative attack (under the so-called 
Chiang Mai Initiative), and efforts to develop a region-wide market for local 
currency bonds. In the medium-term the swap arrangements (now around 
$70 billion) pose a singular challenge to the Fund. If growing cooperation 
among central banks in the region (exemplified by central bank swap 
facilities) leads to an Asian equivalent of a GAB, the Fund’s importance to 
the region will diminish for the same reason that it has all but disappeared in 
the industrialized countries.  
 
The strong development of regional monetary and financial arrangements 
has been pointed out by Henning [2005] and Cohen [2003]. “Cohen counts 
four full-fledged monetary unions, involving 37 countries, thirteen fully 
dollarized countries, five near-dollarized countries, and ten bimonetary 
countries.” 14 Henning also notes that the Exchange Stabilization Fund of the 
United States has entered into nearly 120 agreements since its introduction 
in 1934.  
 
Some developing counties are seeking insurance by coming under the 
umbrella of a major power. The EU will effectively provide insurance for 
new Central and East European members through the ERM2.  The liquidity 
                                                 
14 Henning, [2005] p. 1.  
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provided to these countries will come from the European Central Bank 
rather than the IMF.  
 
The Cold War powerfully shaped the lending of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions in two distinct ways. First, the prospect of a country turning to 
the Soviet Bloc made the market for lending contestable. Second, allies of 
major shareholders could always expect their economic transgressions to 
face less opprobrium. For a while the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to 
remove any political competition, but the war on terrorism and the rise of 
China has changed that. In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, China has 
mounted a charm offensive, with economic deals that eschew advice and 
hectoring. China's demand for raw materials from the latter two regions in 
particular has fuelled a new commodity boom and led China to stake 
strategic partnerships – and much needed investment. China’s volume of 
trade with Africa has quadrupled in the past five years (to reach about $37 
billion).15 And the pragmatic Chinese policies are a much less constraining 
philosophy than that of the Fund’s major shareholders. Thus, even as 
Zimbabwe defaulted on its obligations to the Fund, Beijing rolled out the red 
carpet for President Mugabe. 
 
 
Table 2. Alternate Insurance Mechanisms for LDCs 
 
Region Insurance Mechanism 
Central America (incl. Mexico) Remittances 
East Asia Reserves, Swap Facilities 
East Europe ECB (through EU membership) 
Latin America Reserves 
Mid-East and North Africa Remittances 
Russia Reserves 
South Asia Remittances, Reserves 




                                                 
15 Details of official Chinese policy can be found in "China's African Policy".  The so-called “Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” enshrine mutual territorial respect, non-aggression and non-
interference in each other's internal affairs The white paper promises that the Chinese government will now 
"vigorously encourage” Chinese enterprises to take part in building African infrastructure and help Africa 
to build its own capacity. 
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D. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES 
 
The recent decision of Argentina and Brazil to prepay their IMF debts has 
meant that the Fund income will decline by $116 million in 2006. Apart 
from a short period in 1990, the IMF’s loan book is at its lowest in the past 
quarter century.  One option that the Fund is considering to augment its 
shrinking income is a proposal to invest some of its reserves in higher 
yielding longer-term securities, while another option would find a way to 
generate income from its gold holdings. 
 
One alternative that does not seem to be on the cards is to cut the Fund’s 
administrative expenses. The Fund (like the IBRD) is cost-plus lender and 
therefore has had little incentive to make the sorts of hard choices that are 
forced on its clients. In recent years, the cost of borrowing has increased and 
along with high administrative expenditures, the financial costs of IMF loans 
are high. When added to the political costs, it is hardly surprising, therefore, 
that countries are prepaying loans.  
 
Unlike the Bank, which has undergone several major and wrenching 
organizational changes, the Fund has enjoyed a charmed existence. The only 
fundamental reform occurred in the aftermath of the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system in the early 1970s, but even that had very modest 
organizational effects. However, as discussion above has sought to 
demonstrate, the Fund’s current financial situation is not the result of 
temporary circumstances, but is being driven instead by longer-term 
structural factors. The income pressures facing the Fund will not be resolved 
by tinkering with the budget. The underlying cause of this predicament is 
that the Fund is losing rents that it enjoyed as a monopolist, but which are 
dissipating as alternative sources of insurance and counter-cyclical flows 
become available to developing countries. Consequently, the revenue 
shortfalls facing the Fund are of a more permanent nature than the 
management appears willing to acknowledge. We believe that the Fund has 
little alternative but to swallow some if its own medicine, tightening its belt 
and reducing administrative expenditures. We believe there is considerable 
scope for doing that, though the Fund’s recent strategic review avoided any 
serious consideration of the matter. The standard cost-cutting steps required 
are to overhaul compensation policies, develop more flexible (internal) labor 
markets, greater decentralization and outsourcing to lower cost locations.  
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The biggest anomaly in the Fund’s compensation is its pensions. The 
anomaly is both in terms of level and structure. On level, a comparison of 
the pension of the median Fund staffer with other comparable places (e.g. 
universities) is revealing of the extent to which the Fund has gone 
overboard. It is simply over the top. The present value of the pension due to 
a Fund staffer who retires at B3-B4 level after about 25 years at the Fund is 
about $5-6 million. 
 
Even as the Fund’s advice recommends that countries move from defined 
benefits to defined contributions, its own compensation policy remains 
wedded  to a defined benefit pension system, one of its last bastions in the 
world. Even worse, the defined benefits are linked to a staffer’s last three 
years salary, a perverse incentive from the point of view of another favorite 
Fund recommendation, labor market flexibility. Its pension system actually 
encourages immobility because pensions increase disproportionately with 
years of service: in fact there are two major career kinks, when the pension 
jumps discontinuously, so a staffer within sight of these kinks simply drops 
anchor.  The Fund’s justifies this policy with references to the importance of 
factors such as experience and institutional memory. The Fund, however, 
stands out from other organizations that require similar skills.  
  
A second problem with the Fund’s compensation policies is wage 
compression. The Fund’s standard prescription is to argue for wage 
decompression to allow more flexibility to hire staff with special skills, 
especially at senior levels. Sadly, here too the Fund has failed to follow its 
own advice. Unlike most of its member states, senior Fund staff is well 
compensated.  The wage compression arises from the fact that junior staff is 
compensated much too handsomely, especially when one adds in munificent 
expatriate benefits (home leave, education, the G-5 (ability to “import” 
domestic help) and pensions. These high salaries do not compensate for 
greater risk, since it is virtually impossible to be downsized from the Fund.  
   
A third issue is the need for greater transparency in salary structure. IMF 
staff receives a range of benefits in non-monetized form from education for 
children to home leave travel allowances. The Fund’s message to its civil 
service clients around the world has been a consistent one – monetize all 
benefits so that they are clear and transparent. A comparison of lower level 
total emoluments (including the present value of pension liabilities), with 
his/her counterpart in comparable private/public institutions would be 
telling. 
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Developing countries have a strong interest in pushing for organizational 
changes in the Fund, and in particular a major overhaul of the Fund’s 
personnel and compensation policies, in line with what the institution 
advocates everyone else. Since personnel expenses amount for about 70 
percent of the Fund’s budget (which is approaching nearly $900 million), 
there is simply no alternative but to address the size of staff and the structure 
of compensation. Attempts to reform the Fund’s pension plan (as recent as a 
few months ago) were scuttled when Executive Directors from some 
industrialized countries bowed to pressure from staff.16 These countries feel 
that few nationals from their countries would be willing to join the Fund if 
the compensation package were less attractive. Current policy, however, 
means that developing countries are subsidizing the ability of rich countries 






The lack of voice in the IMF has been a perennial complaint of developing 
countries. Currently Europe (including Russia) accounts for 40% of the 
IMF’s voting share and up to 10 of the 24 seats on the Executive Board.  
Japan, China and India and other East Asian countries account for only 16% 
of the vote share and 5 chairs.  Current discussions indicate that Europe 
might be willing to give up 2% of its vote share (and perhaps one seat), 
which will do little to address the structural imbalance.   
 
However, as Hirschman has pointed out, “voice” is not the sole source of 
legitimacy for an organization. If membership is voluntary, and “exit” does 
not impose onerous costs, then governance by voice is not necessary for 
legitimacy.  Private firms are not democratic but nonetheless enjoy societal 
legitimacy when factor and product markets are competitive, since 
competition gives both input suppliers and output buyers exit options.  Even 
where factor and product markets are not competitive, legitimacy can exist if 
markets are “contestable” (that is, entry costs are low), or where viable anti-
trust and regulatory institutions exist. 
 
                                                 
16 The IMF can learn a little from its sister institution, the World Bank, which moved toward defined 
contribution pension schemes and more transparent, monetized benefits since 1997. 
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Consequently the possibility of exit even in the absence of voice could give 
the Fund greater legitimacy. Unfortunately, for virtually all developing 
countries exit was not a viable option. The “market” for international 
organizations is, for the most part, not contestable except in the few areas 
where both regional and global institutions exist. Thus in development 
projects borrowers had some choice between a regional development bank, 
the World Bank, and (to varying degrees) the private sector. In some cases 
countries can engage in forum-shopping – for instance Canada, Mexico, and 
the US can chose between NAFTA and the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanisms in cases of trade dispute resolution.  But in many important 
areas this has not been true, especially in the case of functions and services 
supplies by the IMF – until now.  
 
Among the public goods that the Fund provides, including information, 
analysis, advice to individual governments, advice on co-ordination of 
policies, management of defaults and emergency lending, viable alternatives 




We find a variety of initiatives and developments outside the Fund that 
complement or substitute for the IMF’s financial coordination, insurance and 
surveillance functions. It seems highly likely that the cumulative effect of 
those initiatives has been, in some degree, to reduce the risk and potential 
costs of financial instability, in short, to make the world safer, though it is 
difficult to arrive at a more precise assessment due to the lack of systematic 
data, to the heterogeneous nature of the initiatives, and to the fact that many 
have an informal character. However, the evidence suggests a growing trend 
that is driven both by the growth and diversification of financial markets, 
and by the increasing complexity of global and national governance. A 
September 2004 report to the IMF Board, The Fund’s Strategic Direction, 
opens with a reference to the “tectonic shifts in the ground the IMF is 
directed to tend,” and acknowledging that “in some important measures, the 
Fund has lagged rather than led.”17 Those lags are part of the explanation for 
the surge in non-Fund initiatives aimed at reducing financial vulnerability, 
                                                 
17 The Fund’s Strategic Direction – Preliminary Considerations, a report by The Secretary to the 
International Monetary Committee on the Fund’s Strategic Direction, September 30, 2004, p. 2.  
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whether as a direct intent, as in the case of regional insurance arrangements, 
higher reserve holdings, and increased market-based surveillance, or as an 
indirect effect of other governance objectives, especially the rapid growth of 
bilateral and regional trade agreements. However, this paper has argued that 
the resort to non-Fund alternatives is also driven in part by the increasing 
cost of Fund resources, largely explained by its very high administrative 
budget.  
 
Further analysis is needed to explore the extent to which these developments 
can be integrated into a new model for the management of financial 
instability in the world, a model that will complement the centralized 
decision and rule-making capacities of an IMF with the more flexible, and 
more participatory, decentralized governance that is being generated through 
the combined action of national governments, regional arrangements, market 
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1991 1998 2004 
Asia 174.4 408.6 1,033.3 
Asia ex China 75.9 240.3 580.3 
Africa 13.9 28.9 81.4 
South and 
Central America 
44.7 112.5 139.2 
Developing 
Europe 
15.4 71.7 211.9 















1991 1998 2005 
Asia 5.0 24.2 7.6 
Asia ex China 4.7 24.2 7.6 
Africa 5.9 6.8 4.4 
South and 
Central America 
12.1 15.6 9.2 
Developing 
Europe 
3.5 19.7 13.2 
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Ratio of Developing Country Reserves to IMF Loans 
 
Region 1991 1998 2004 
Asia 34.7 16.9 119.9 
Asia ex China 16.2 9.9 67.3 
Africa 2.4 4.3 16 
South and 
Central America 3.7 7.2 5 
Developing 
Europe 4.4 3.7 10.7 
Middle East 247.3 121.6 134.7 
 


























net private capital inflows










 22Visiting Resource Professor Papers LLILAS, The University of Texas at Austin http://www.utexas.edu/cola/insts/llilas/
